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Abstract
This paper brings experimental evidence on investors’ behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint,
where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The
experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment context. Results
confirm the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as long as a first illiquidity default does not occur,
investors do not seem able to fully internalize it. After several defaults, agents manage to coordinate on a
default probability above which they refuse to participate to the project. This default probability is lower
than the default probability of the first illiquidity default.
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1 Introduction
Once again, during the Great Recession of 2007-2009, illiquidity proved to be one major factor of
economic instability (Pedersen, 2009; Brunermeyer, 2009; Miller and Stiglitz, 2010). In a short
lapse of time, in the last four months of 2008, traditional buyers of many asset backed securities
and bank commercial paper, all vanished. Taking one representative quote from The Economist
of February 10th, 2010, "Many of those clobbered in the crisis, including Bearn Sterns, Northern
Rock and AIG — were struck down by a sudden lack of cash or funding sources, not because they
run out of capital."1 One important lesson from the last recession is that researchers must provide
a much better understanding of liquidity crises than they hold today.
Morris and Shin (2009) notice that the credit risk of any institution has three diﬀerent mea-
sures. They define the insolvency risk as the conditional probability of default due to deterioration
of asset quality if there is no run by short term creditors in the first place. The total credit risk
is the unconditional probability of default, either because of short-term creditor run or long term
asset insolvency. Illiquidity risk is the diﬀerence between the two, i.e., the probability of a run on
an otherwise solvent institution.2
In general economists explain illiquidity as an ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome, where, in absence
of a coordination mechanism, investors’ cannot coordinate their actions on the high equilibrium.
The basic rationale was introduced by Summers (2000, p.7):
A crude but simple game, related to Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig’s (1983)
celebrated analysis of bank runs, illustrates some of the issues involved here. Imagine
that everyone who has invested $10 with me can expect to earn $1, assuming that I
stay solvent. Suppose that if I go bankrupt, investors who remain lose their whole
$10 investment, but that an investor who withdraws today neither gains nor loses.
What would you do? Each individual judgment would presumably depend on one’s
assessment of my prospects, but this in turn depends on the collective judgment of all
1 Governments also can be victims of sudden and unexpected investors’ run. See Summers (2000) and Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009).
2 See also Besancenot and Vranceanu (2007) for a similar decomposition of total risk into insolvency and
illiquidity.
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of the investors. Suppose, first, that my foreign reserves, ability to mobilize resources,
and economic strength are so limited that if any investor withdraws I will go bank-
rupt. It would be a Nash equilibrium (indeed, a Pareto-dominant one) for everyone
to remain, but (I expect) not an attainable one. Someone would reason that some-
one else would decide to be cautious and withdraw, or at least that someone would
reason that someone would reason that someone would withdraw, and so forth. This
phenomenon, which Douglas Hofstadter has labeled “reverberant doubt,” would likely
lead to large-scale withdrawals, and I would go bankrupt. It would not be a close-run
thing. John Maynard Keynes’s beauty contest captures a similar idea.
Hence the theory of global (or coordination) games appears to provide a good background for
understanding illiquidity. In these games, the individual payoﬀ to some action is an increasing
function in the number of agents that undertake that action (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993;
Morris and Shin, 1998; 2007).3 Bryant (1983) shows that in a complete information set-up
these strategic complementarities result in multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling beliefs. The polar
situations where either all players undertake the highest action (the Pareto dominant or payoﬀ
dominant equilibrium) or the lowest action (the highest security or minimax equilibrium) are intu-
itively appealing but cannot be justified on pure deductive grounds. To remove this indeterminacy,
Van Huyck et al. (1990) have run an experiment of a basic coordination game with complete in-
formation and find that, after repeating the game for several times, the security equilibrium takes
over the other equilibria.4
Rochet and Vives (2004) and Morris and Shin (2009) apply the theory of coordination games
to banking crises. The main contribution of these papers is to combine the analysis of illiquidity
with that of insolvency. The former can arise if banks cannot roll over their short term debt due
to coordination problems, while insolvency is defined as the riskiness of their long-term investment
3 The core logic of these n-player games can be inferred from the classical two player ‘stag hunt’ game. See
Camerer (2003) for an analysis of its equilibria and empirical tests.
4 Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2001) consider the same game under diﬀerent information treatments. See also
Devetag (2003). A related problem is the "dying seminar game" introduced by Schelling (1978), and analyzed in
an experimental setting by Semeshenko et al. (2009).
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projects, conditional of not being illiquid at the first stage.5 Schotter and Yorulmmazer (2004)
and Madiès (2006) have provided experimental analyses of classical bank runs; they focus on
depositors’ decision to pull out their money once that a bank becomes insolvent.
To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between the intrinsic risk of an asset (insolvency)
and illiquidity has not been tested in laboratory experiments. In this paper, we report results of
a simple experiment aiming to directly assess the contribution of illiquidity to the total risk of
an investment project. The project can deliver either a positive gain or nothing, with a known
and predetermined probability. Without illiquidity, this "insolvency" or "intrinsic" probability
of default is the only risk that investors should take into account. However, for a large and
indivisible investment project, investors must pool resources in order to implement it. If the
number of investors is too small, the project can only fail, what we refer to as the "illiquidity
risk". If the number of investors is large enough, the project is implemented and will succeed or
not, depending on the intrinsic probability of success.
To take an example, suppose that a famous biologist wants to implement a research
programme on a new molecule with huge market value for drug companies. He wants
to run this project by creating a company, and sells one year bonds for 2000 euros
each, with a face value of 3000. In order to able to carry out its research, he needs
a molecular microscope that costs one million euros. So, if there are less than 500
lenders, he cannot buy this heavy equipment, the research cannot be engaged, and his
nascent company will fail and lenders will lose their investment. If the microscope is
bought, then the gain can be positive (if he succeeds) or zero (if we assume, not very
realistically, that a second hand microscope worth nothing).
To test if whether investors (lenders) are able to internalize this "illiquidity risk", we set up
an experiment as a pure coordination game. While the connection with the financial market is
5 The finance literature also brings a significant contribution to understanding the illiquidity risk, defined as a
situation where suddenly the various arbitrageurs refuse to buy assets. For instance, Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
present a simple theoretical model that helps explain how asset prices are aﬀected by liquidity risk and commonality
in liquidity. The spiral of panic-driven asset liquidation, specific to the 2008 turmoil, was analyzed by Pedersen
(2009). See also Besancenot et al. (2004) and Besancenot and Vranceanu (2007) for another model of interaction
between insolvency risk and illiquidity risk (without coordination diﬃculties).
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straightforward, we avoid using words such as "loan, debt, default" that have their own emotional
loading. Basically, subjects can pay 20 cents in order to participate to a lottery that brings them
30 cents with a probability q and nothing with probability (1 − q). This intrinsic risk (1 − q) is
common knowledge. If this lottery is interpreted as an investment into a risky project, in case of
default of the borrower (with probability 1 − q), the lender loses his investment, in the opposite
case (with probability q), the lender makes a net profit of 10 cents.
Students were invited to play two games. In the first game, referred to as the "no-interaction
game", the outcome of the investment depends on the individual risk only (with no interaction
between individuals’ decisions). In the second game, referred to as "the illiquidity game", the
positive gain is delivered only if at least x% of the subjects have participated to the investment.
This participation constraint is inspired by the investment story, where the success of a joint
project depends on the participation of a large enough number of individual investors. Hence, an
investor must not only take into account the individual chances that his investment will bring him
the high payoﬀ, but also the would-be decisions of the other investors.
The same group of subjects was asked to play the illiquidity game for several times, for varying
levels of the intrinsic risk. We observe for what level of the displayed individual risk they coordinate
their actions either on the "invest" or "do not invest" strategy. Actually, the experiment aims to
elicit "threshold strategies" on which players do coordinate their decisions, in the line with the
experiment implemented by Heinemann et al. (2004).6
The experiment provides several interesting insights. Firstly, we observe that the minimax
equilibrium — where no investor participates to the market and the investment is not implemented
— never occurs. [Appendix 1 provides a theoretical explanation for this outcome]. Secondly, there
is a default threshold for the risk probability (1 − q) on which agents tend to coordinate their
actions. Thirdly, this default threshold is smaller in presence of the illiquidity risk than without
the illiquidity risk, but agents manage to coordinate on this threshold only after several defaults.
We comment on the policy implications of these results in the conclusion section.
6 These scholars have designed an experiment of a currency speculative attack model, where chances that
devaluation occurs depend on the number of traders that attack the currency.
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For sure, as any experimental research, this paper has its own limits. At diﬀerence with a
standard global game, in our experiment the individual’s payoﬀ does not depend on some order
statistics of the group (minimum, maximum, average) and the percentage of investors that triggers
illiquidity is exogenously given. The advantage of this simple experiment is that it can disentangle
the illiquidity risk (stemming from poor coordination) from the total risk of the investment. Fur-
ther research might test the game for varying participation thresholds, or make this participation
threshold endogenous.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the experimental design. Section
3 provides the results of the experiment. Section 4 presents our conclusion.
2 Experimental design
All the subjects were recruited by the ESSEC Experimental Laboratory from the student popu-
lation of the ESSEC Business School, who answered to a call for paid decision experiments. The
experimental design was presented via computer interface and all interactions were computer-
ized. The programme was written in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read aloud.
Throughout the sessions students were not allowed to communicate and could not see the others’
screen. The core study builds on a "within-subjects" design, but we also tested the illiquidity
game alone. In the within-subjects set-up, three sessions were conducted in May (9 students),
June (15 students) and November 2010 (16 students). [see Appendix 3 for the instructions].
There is a basic lottery L defined as an elementary two-payoﬀ gamble:
Lottery L :
½
30 cents with a probability q
0 cent with a probability 1− q
In the first game students were invited to play repeatedly the lottery L. At each round, they
receive 20 cents before making their choice (play or not the lottery); loses and gains were also
material. The individual levels of risk, i.e., the probability (1− q) of losing the 20 cents bet, was
announced and was varied discretely, rising from 0.05 to 0.70 with a step of 0.05 over a total of
14 rounds. After each round the student who chooses to participate is informed about the actual
outcome (win/loss). In this paper, we will refer to this game as the "no interaction game".
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Students where then asked to play for several times a second game, referred to as "the illiquidity
game". As in the former setup, at every round students get 20 cents. They can use them to
participate to the lottery L (with a known probability q of winning the positive payoﬀ). Yet
this time an additional constraint is brought into the picture: if less than 50% of the players
participate to the lottery at that round, they will receive nothing whatever the outcome of the
individual draw.7 Hence, the students must take into account not only the individual risk, but
also the risk related to the behavior of the others students in the group.
The screen inviting the student to participate to the game recalls the possible payoﬀs, indicates
the "individual risk" (1− q) of the lottery at that round and the percent of students who played
the lottery at the previous round.
Once that all players have taken their decision (to play the game or not), the computer displays
what was the percentage of participants at that round, and, if the student played the game, which
was the outcome of the game (0 or 30 cents).
In this game, the level of individual risk (i.e., the loss probability 1 − q) varies according to
a simple rule (Figure 2). The game starts at t = 0 with a small default risk, (1 − q) = 0.15. As
long as no illiquidity default occurs the risk is increased by 0.05 from one round to another. If
an illiquidity default occurs, the same level of risk is submitted once again. Then, if illiquidity
arises, the level of risk is reduced by 0.05 at the next round; if else, it is increased by 0.05. The
experiment stops after 31 rounds.
At the end of the game the software indicates the total gain of every student. A short satisfac-
tion survey is implemented. These experiments last for 45 minutes in average. Students earned
in average 13.25 euros from playing the game; the amount includes 5 euros for showing up.
In order to control for the carry over eﬀect specific to the within-subjects design, we run two
additional sessions, where we asked students to perform only the illiquidity game, with the same
rules as before. These sessions were organized in April 6 and May 18, 2011, with respectively 10
and 12 subjects.
7 If 50% or more of the players participate to the lottery, individuals who participated receive the actual outcome
of the lottery (such as drew by the computer with the announced probability).
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yes
(1‐q)
illiquidity
(1‐q)
no
yes
(1‐q) ‐ 0.05
illiquidity
no
(1‐q) + 0.05
(1‐q) + 0.05
t=0 : 1‐q = 0.05
Figure 1: The risk adjustment rule
3 Results
3.1 Data from the within-subjects design
We report firstly the result of the within-subjects set of experiments, where the same group of
students first played the "no interaction game", and then the "illiquidity game".
Table 1 displays the summary of the results of the "no interaction game": the outcome of
an individual decision depends only on the risk (1− q); there is no interaction between students’
decisions. The first line indicates the loss probability (1 − q). The next lines indicates for each
probability the number of students who accept to play the basic lottery.
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(1− q) = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
May 26, 2010
N=9 8 8 9 9 9 8 6 7 5 6 4 2 2 2
June 9, 2010
N=15 15 15 15 14 14 14 11 9 5 5 2 1 1 2
Nov. 3, 2010
N=16 14 15 16 15 15 13 10 8 9 8 7 1 2 0
Table 1. Number of students that choose to play the lottery in the no-interaction game
We notice that less than 50% of the students played the lottery when the objective risk (1− q)
first exceeded 0.55 in the first and third group, and 0.45 in the second group.8
Table 2 presents the main results of the "illiquidity game" (students’ decisions are now in-
terconnected - the individual gain is paid if at least 50% of the students participate). The data
indicate the announced loss probability (1− q) that triggered the first illiquidity default (i.e. less
than 50% of the students lend), then the loss probability when more than 50% of the students
decided to lend again (return-to-market); the same sequence is repeated three more times. The
number between brackets gives the number of students who accepted to play the lottery for that
"threshold" probability. In Appendix 2 we present graphs that show the evolution of the group
decision during the experience (for each group).
1st default Lend again 2nd default Lend again 3rd default Lend again 4th default Lend again
May 26, 2010
N=9 0.40 (4) 0.25 (7) 0.40 (0) 0.25 (6) 0.35 (1) 0.25 (6) 0.35 (1) x
June 9, 2010
N=15 0.45 (4) 0.35 (10) 0.40 (6) 0.30 (12) 0.40 (1) 0.30 (13) 0.40 (0) 0.30 (12)
Nov. 3, 2010
N=16 0.40 (7) 0.25 (8) 0.35 (6) 0.25 (10) 0.30 (7) 0.25 (15) 0.30 (2) 0.25 (14)
8 Since in this lottery, risk neutral individuals should stop lending for a risk above 0.33, these results indicate
that in our setup some individuals might have a preference for risk.
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Table 2. Illiquidity and return-to-market thresholds (1− q).
(Between brackets, the number of students who play the lottery)
The first default occurs for (1 − p) = 0.40 in groups 1 and 3, and 0.45 in the second group.
Once that illiquidity occurs, students adopt a security attitude, and refuse to lend in a coordinated
way until the individual risk is further reduced (below 0.25 for groups 1 and 3, 0.35 for group 2).
After a few defaults (not more than three), students manage to coordinate their strategies: a
large majority of players refuse to play when a critical threshold is reached (0.35 in the first
group, 0.40 in the second and 0.30 in the third). The number of persons that coordinate their
decision around this critical value increases throughout the rounds; after three default rounds,
almost all the population in the sample coordinate their decision at that level. The fourth default
threshold is lower than the first default threshold in the illiquidity game for all the three sessions.
The Wilcoxon signed ranks test performed for 40 students shows that the threshold reduction is
statistically significant at p − value < 0.01 (there are 27 negative ranks, 1 positive rank and 12
ties).
When comparing data from Table 1 with Table 2, it turns out that the first default threshold
in the "illiquidity game" is lower than in the "no interaction game" for the groups 1 and 3; it
is the same for the group 2. In order to check whether the reduction is statistically significant
over the total sample, we run a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. We must remove from the analysis
7 individuals over 40 whose behavior was inconsistent.9 The assumption according to which the
threshold in the illiquidity game is lower than in the elementary decision can be accepted for a
p− value < 0.01 (there are 19 negative ranks, 9 positive ranks and 8 ties).
Figure 3 summarizes these findings. The first set of bars build on data from Table 1 relative to
the "no-interaction game"; they indicate for each group the smallest risk probability for which less
than 50% of the students decided participate to the lottery (similar to the illiquidity scenario in
the second game). The next sets of bars build on data from Table 2, pertaining to the "illiquidity
game". For each session, we select the critical thresholds (1− q) when the first illiquidity default
9 These subjects did not participate to the lottery in the "no interaction game for" a small risk, then participated
for a higher risk, than did not for a even higher risk. Is is therefore impossible to determine their reservation risk.
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00,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
Less than 50% participate 
to L in the "no  interaction 
game"
First default in the 
"illiquidity game"
Lend again after 3rd 
default in the "illiquidity 
game"
4th default  in "the 
illiquidity game"
May 26, 2010 (N=9) June 9, 2010 (N=15) November 3, 2010 (N=16)
Figure 2: Critical thresholds in the "no interaction game" and the "illiquidity game": a within-
subjects design
occurs, the critical thresholds for which students decide to lend again after the 3rd default, and
the critical thresholds at the fourth default.
We can notice that after several illiquidity defaults, the level of risk above which a majority
of students refuse to play the lottery (i.e. the illiquidity threshold (1− q)∗) is much lower than in
the individual choice setup, down from [0.45− 0.55] to [0.30− 0.40].
3.2 Data from the between-subjects design
To check whether this pattern holds in a bewteen-subjects framework, we carried out the experi-
ment twice again in April and May 2011, and asked students to play only the illiquidity game. For
sure, in this case there is no perception of change in the rules that could prompt them to be more
careful when moving from one game to the other. Results are close to the former within-subjects
setup. As shown in Table 4 and the last two graphs displayed in Appendix 2, after a first illiquidity
default (that occurs for a high level of risk), investors adjust downwards the acceptable limit.
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00,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
First default in the 
"illiquidity game"
Lend again after 3rd 
default in the "illiquidity 
game"
4th default  in the 
"illiquidity game"
April 6, 2011 (N=10) May 18, 2011 (N=12)
Figure 3: Critical thresholds in the "illiquidity game".
1st default Lend again 2nd default Lend again 3rd default Lend again 4th default Lend again
April 6, 2011
N=10 0.50 (2) 0.35 (6) 0.45 (2) 0.40 (6) 0.45 (2) 0.40 (6) 0.45 (1) 0.40 (6)
May 18, 2011
N=12 0.55 (1) 0.35 (7) 0.45 (1) 0.35 (8) 0.45 (2) 0.35 (11) 0.45 (2) —
Table 4. Illiquidity and no-illiquidity thresholds (1− q).
(Between brackets, the number of students who play the lottery)
Coordination around a critical threshold is achieved around a risk probability 0.45, lower than
the probability of the first default (see Figure 4).
If we compare now the probability of the first default in the second wave of experiments
with the probability where less than 50% participate in the elementary game in the first wave of
experiments, the diﬀerence is not significant. Without the carry-over eﬀect specific to the within-
subjects design, students seem unable to internalize the illiquidity risk: the first default in the
illiquidity game is at the same risk level where less than 50% participate to the lottery in the
elementary game. Once that default occurs, the learning process is engaged, and they end up
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.28
.32
.36
.40
.44
.48
.52
.56
QRBS1
QRBS2
QRWS1
QRWS2
QRWS3
1st default 2nd default 3rd default 4th default 5th default
default threshold
Figure 4: Order-n default thersholds in five experiments
coordinating around a lower default threshold, as they did in the within-subjects design. This
default coordination threshold seems to be higher in this last wave of experiments than in the
within-subjects experiments (check data in column "4th default" in Tables 3 and 4).
3.3 A pooled data analysis
A simple pooled data analysis allows us to emphasize as a general pattern the systematic down-
wards revision in the illiquidity default thresholds. For so doing, we report for each experiment
the probabilities that triggered the first, second, third, fourth and fifth default; the order number
n of the default is similar here to the time dimension in standard pooled data analysis.
The series of the threshold default probabilities for each of the within-subjects experiments
(May 26, June 9 and November 3, 2010 - data from Table 2) are denoted respectively by QRWS1,
QRWS2, QRWS3 ; the series of the default threshold for the between-subject design (April 6
and May 18, 2011 - data from Table 4) are denoted by QRBS1 and QRBS2. The five series are
displayed in Figure 5, where the horizontal axis corresponds to the order number of the default
(first, second, etc.) and the vertical axis indicates the threshold risk (1−q) for which the illiquidity
default occurred (less than 50% of the students participate to the lottery).
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We then run the regression:
QRjn = C + Fj + an+ bn2 + jn (1)
where j stands for the experiment [WS1, WS2, WS3, BS1, BS2], C is the overall constant, Fj is
the fixed eﬀect for each experience (a dummy variable), n is the order number or the default, a
and b are coeﬃcients and jn is an error term. The quadratic form is interesting since it allows
for a dampening eﬀect, representative of the convergence put forward in the descriptive statistics.
The OLS estimation of Equation (1) are displayed in Table 5. The dependent variable is
the illiquidity default threshold QRjn. Model 1 is a special case of model 2, where we omit the
quadratic term.
Variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2
C 0.4581*** 0.517***
n -0.0175*** -0.0700***
n^2 — 0.0091***
Fixed eﬀects (cross section)
WS1-F -0.0394 -0.0356
WS2-F 0.0043 0.0023
WS3-F -0.0756 -0.0776
BS1-F 0.0543 0.0523
BS2-F 0.0606 0.064319
Nb obs. (unbalanced) 23 23
R2−Adjusted 0.857 0.922
Proba(F-stat) 0.00 0.00
(***) indicates significance at 1%.
Table 5. Output of the regression model
As expected, the coeﬃcient a is negative in both models: players revise downwards their default
thresholds. In model 2, the small and positive coeﬃcient of the quadratic term is also consistent
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with our expectations: after several successive defaults, the strength of the adjustment is declining.
From model 1, we notice that from the first to the fourth default, in average the default threshold
would vary by −0.0525, i.e. 11% below the average first default threshold. Model 2 would suggest
that after three more defaults, the default threshold would vary by −0.0735, i.e., 14% below the
average first default threshold.
The analysis of the fixed eﬀects also brings some interesting insights. Indeed, as we have already
seen, the default thresholds in between-subjects experiments (BS1 and BS2) are systematically
higher than in within-subjects experiments (WS1, WS2, WS3).
4 Conclusion and some policy implications
In a world where financial markets would further deepen and broaden, the lack of coordination
of lenders or investors might well generalize as a factor of risk. The Asian crisis of 1997, the
Argentinean default of 2001, the 2007-2009 Great Recession are representative of the dramatic
consequences of sudden illiquidity upspring.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an experimental framework able to replicate
the essential features of institutional credit risk, where default of the borrower can stem from both
an intrinsic risk specific to the project, and illiquidity or poor coordination of the investors.
Our simple laboratory experiment has confirmed the insidious nature of the illiquidity risk: as
long as a first illiquidity default does not happen, subjects do not seem able to fully internalize it:
the first default threshold in the illiquidity game is systematically higher than the fourth default
threshold. If in real life investors can neither fully internalize the illiquidity risk, it is not surprising
that there are not many signals that can call policymakers’ attention on the accumulation of such
imbalances. Indeed, illiquidity crises often come as a surprise. This phenomenon was extremely
prominent during the Great Recession, when in 2008 buyers of many financial assets vanished in a
short lapse of time and many financial markets, such as the market for CDOs, literally collapsed.
Our Lab experiment has shown that subjects become aware of the illiquidity risk after several
defaults; they tend to adopt a threshold strategy that allows them to coordinate on a level of
risk above which they refuse to participate to the market. In the experiment, it took a small
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number of defaults to reach this lower default threshold. In policy terms, for all financial markets
where liquidity matters, the measure of what a "sustainable risk level" is should be adjusted
downwards.10 Many asset-pricing models build their evaluation on the asset’s past performance;
in the light of our analysis, if one asset has never been shunned by investors, then the price
predicted by these models will have an upward bias due to an underestimated illiquidity risk.
Finally, immediately after a first illiquidity default, subjects in our experiment adopted a
security stance, and refused to lend until the objective risk declined in a substantial way (without
falling to zero). This second eﬀect can be responsible of some crisis hysteresis. Before the Great
Recession, banks were financing many high risk projects. Actually, many observers claim that this
"race for risk" is a deep underlying factor of the crisis (Besancenot and Vranceanu, 2011). Yet after
the crisis, the same banks were criticized on ground that they were too cautious, and did not lend
enough. Our analysis points out that this extremely prudent attitude is the normal behavioral
response after an illiquidity-driven crisis. Banks need to test the coordination mechanism before
they start lending again.
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5 Appendix 1. Theory: equilibrium of the illiquidity game
In this Appendix, we analyze the equilibrium of the game from a theoretical perspective. We
consider an imperfect information game where a group of n identical risk-neutral players (where
n is an odd number) are invited to play a lottery L that can pay:
½
30 cents with a probability q
0 cent with a probability 1− q
The probability q is public information. The cost of entering this lottery is 20 cents.
For sure, if no other motive of default is present, identical risk-neutral individuals would
participate to the lottery if the winning probability exceeds a threshold qˆ, implicitly defined by
equation:
20 = 30q. (2)
If q < qˆ = 2/3, a risk-neutral, rational player will not participate to the lottery.
In order to bring into the picture the risk of illiquidity, we impose the exogenous rule according
to which if less than x% of the subjects participate to the lottery, they all get nothing whatever
the outcome of the individual draw.
While in this game all individuals know the intrinsic risk (1 − q), they might not have the
same perception of the illiquidity risk, which depends on the decision of all other players. Thus,
given q, each player must decide whether to play the lottery (strategy y) or to refrain from playing
(strategy n) depending on his own assessment the actions of the others. In such a game, the
optimal strategy s of an individual i consists in choosing a reservation probability q∗i and play the
game if the actual probability is larger than this critical threshold (and vice-versa), i.e.:
si =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
y, if q ≥ q∗i
n, if q < q∗i
(3)
According to his subjective expectation of the others’ behavior, each individual i will choose his
specific reservation probability q∗i .
Let us order now the n players according to their q∗i , from the lowest to the highest value. We
define as the "pivot player" the player m such that the number of players with q∗ > q∗m represent
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x% of the total number of subjects. For an objective risk q, if the m individual plays y (q > q∗m),
then illiquidity does not arise; to the opposite, if he plays n, then more than x% of the players do
the same, and illiquidity occurs. It must be noticed that, when taking their individual decision,
players should consider only the decision of the pivot player, and not the individual decision of
all players. As a consequence, the outcome of this game should not depend on the number of
players.11
We denote by F i() the player’s i subjective c.d.f of q∗m.
For a given probability of getting the positive gain in the lottery, q, the gain from participating
to the illiquidity game U i(y) is obtained by multiplying the positive payoﬀ in the lottery (30)
by the individual probability of winning (q) and by the probability that the pivot player does
play the game, i.e. that q∗m is lower than q; this probability is defined for the individual i as
Pri[q∗m < q] = F
i(q).
U i(y) = 30qF i(q) (4)
We notice that U i(y) is a monotonous increasing function in q with U i(y) = 0 for q = 0 and
U i(y) = 30 for q = 1.
The reservation probability q∗i turns out to be the value of q such that an individual i is
indiﬀerent between the two strategies, i.e. U i(n) = U i(y), where in this game U i(n) = 20.
Formally, q∗i is the implicit solution to:
20 = 30qF i(q). (5)
Figure 1 represents the left-hand terms in Eq. (2) and Eq. (5) as two functions of q. At point A
we get the critical default probability in the elementary setting (no interaction), at point A0 the
critical default probability in the illiquidity game. Even in the simplified context of this theoretical
analysis (homogenous, risk neutral players), in presence of the liquidity constraint players require
a higher winning probability (or a lower default probability) in order to accept the lottery. Should
investors have diﬀerent preferences towards risk, it would be more diﬃcult to foresee the behavior
11 If players can implement some form of coordination, probably the number players should matter.
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of the pivot player (the p.d.f. of F would become wider and flatter), and the minimum wining
probability required to participate would rise.
10
20
30
30qFi(q)
qi* Winning probabilityqi
30q
^
A A’
q
Payoff
Figure 5: Critical winning thersholds for individual i
Furthermore, with homogenous, fully rational players the first occurrence of illiquidity default
would reveal the true value of the threshold q∗. After the firs default the distribution F i() would
degenerate and players should coordinate their decision around this value (i.e., the threshold
strategy, to use the concept submitted by Heinemann et al. 2004).
The experiment presented in the core text aims at analyzing how a group of "flesh and blood"
decision makers behave within the former framework. The core issue is whether players do in-
ternalize the coordination risk, and, if they do, how fast. For sure, human subjects are not
"homogenous"; they have their own psychological characteristics and biases (cognitive skills, var-
ious risk aversion, overconfidence/over prudence); in this case, the illiquidity default threshold
would emerge at the term of a learning process.
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6 Appendix 2
The figures below indicate the evolution of illiquidity defaults depending on the level of risk. The
computer chooses the level of risk according to the rule presented in Figure 2.
6.1 Data for the within-subjects experiments
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6.2 Data for the "between-subjects" experiments
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7 Appendix 3. Instructions for the within-subjects experi-
ment12
Screen 1. Welcome to the ESSEC Experimental Laboratory. This experiment aims at studying
the interaction between two risks and their consequences on the individuals’ decisions. There will
be two stages, one warming-up non-paid stage, and a paid stage. Pay attention please: the game
progresses when the last player take his/her decision.
THE WARMING-UP GAME
Screen 2. Lotteries. It costs you 20 cents to participate to a lottery. The lottery will allow
you either to gain 30 cents or nothing.
Screens 3-4-5. Would you pay 20 cents to participate to a lottery that brings you 30 cents
with a probability of 60% (50%, 40%) and 0 cents with a probability of 40% (50%, 60%) ? Yes/No.
THE ELEMENTARY GAME
Screen 6. From now on the experiment will be paid. You receive the money at the beginning
of each game and the decisions are material.
Screen 7. You will receive 20 cents at each round of the game. You can use them to buy
the right to play a lottery. If you play the lottery, you lose and the gain is zero or you can win
30 cents. The loss probability will be displayed on the screen. This is the true probability used
by the computer to pick the outcome. If you answer Yes to the question "do you accept to play
the lottery" the participation fee is charged and you will benefit of the outcome of the lottery.
Payment rule: if you do not play, the 20 cents are kept on your account. If you play and win,
your account is credited of 30 cents. If you play an loose, your account is credited of 0 cents.
Screens 8 and next. Number of the actual round [1 to 14]. The loss probability is [1− q].13
"Do you accept to play this lottery ?" Yes/No.
Screens 8’ and next. Outcome of the round. You decided not to play; your gain is [20]. OR
You decided to play; you gain is [0 or 30].
12 Original instructions in French.
13 From one round to another, 1− q will be increased by 0.05, from 0.05 to 0.70.
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THE ILLIQUIDITY GAME
Screen 9. In this game there is an additional risk stemming from group behavior.
As before, you get 20 cents at each round. You can use them to buy the right to play a lottery
that delivers either 30 cents or 0 cents. As before, this external probability of the zero payoﬀ is
indicated at each round.
At diﬀerence with the previous game:
- if at least [50%] of the players in the group participate, the loss / win outcome depends only
on this external probability.
- if less than [50%] of the players participate to the lottery, the gain is [zero] for all players
who participated to the lottery.
Slide 10. Examples
Example 1. There are 20 subjects. The displayed probability of loss is [1− q]. For this level of
risk, 6 players participate, 14 do not. Less than [50%] participate.
Outcome: All those who participate get zero, all those who did not keep the 20 cents.
Example 2. There are 20 subjects. The displayed probability of loss is [1− q]. For this level of
risk, 18 players participate, 2 do not. More than [50%] participate.
Outcome: Those who did not participate keep the 20 cents. Those who participate get 30
cents with a probability [q] and zero with a probability [1− q].
Screens 11 and next. Number of the actual round [1 to 31]. The loss probability is [1−q].14
At the former round, the percentage of subjects that participated to the lottery was of [y%]. "Do
you accept to play the lottery ?" Yes/No.
Screens 11’ and next. Outcome of the lottery. The loss probability was [1−q]. You decided
to participate (not to participate). The percentage of players is [z%], i.e. more (less) than [50%].
If "less" - your gain is zero. If "more": you earn 30 cents (or you get zero).
Screen 12. Your total gain is [A] euros. Thank you for your participation to this experiment.
14 From one round to another, this probability will vary starting from 0.15 according to the rule described in
Section 2.
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